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I. Introduction 
Discretion is an inevitable intellectual tool in the application of Law. Legal terms are 
often uncertain and rules give the judge room for more than one choice. The complexity 
of competing values and competing interests in different fields precludes the 
formulation of specific rules. The legislator confers a discretionary jurisdiction on some 
official or authority. Courts expressly use discretion when sentencing in criminal cases.1 
The outer limit of this freedom of decision is arbitrariness. The sanctioning regime of 
Article 260 (2) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union describes one of 
these "discretion-situations": "If the Commission considers that the Member State 
concerned has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the 
Court, it may bring the case before the Court after giving that State the opportunity to 
submit its observations. It shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment 
to be paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. If the Court finds that the Member State concerned has not complied 
with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it." 
The wording of this paragraph does not contain any indication of the principles and 
practical considerations (for example upper and/or lower limits) concerning the 
imposition of the two financial sanctions. On the contrary, expressions like "It [the 
Commission] shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be paid 
by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances", 
and "the Court...way impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it" suggest that these 
Institutions have a considerable power of discretion in the matter. This contribution is 
intended to shed light on the use of discretion in the framework of the Article 260 (2) 
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procedure, with special attention to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice concerning 
the imposition of a lump sum. 
II. The Commission's first attempt to "auto-regulate" its own discretionary power — the 
communications of1996/97 
In 1996 the Commission published a memorandum on the application of Article 171 EC. 
It took the view that ".the Commission, in a spirit of openness, believes that it must 
publicly state the criteria it means to apply in asking the Court to impose monetary 
penalties."2 The Commission considered that the penalty payment is the most appropriate 
instmment for achieving the basic objective of the new mechanism, i.e. compliance as 
rapidly as possible with the obligations stemming from EC law. That is why it decided to 
ask, as a rule, only a penalty payment and not a lump sum. The fundamental criteria which 
the Commission is intended to use when calculating the amount of the penalty payment 
are a) the seriousness of the infringement, b) its duration, c) the need to ensure that the 
penalty itself is a deterrent to further infringement. 
As regards seriousness, the importance of the Community rules which have been 
infringed and the effects of the infringement on general and particular interests will be 
taken in account. The duration must be considerable. In order to secure the deterrent 
effect, the Commission will not propose to the Court a purely symbolic penalty. A more 
exact method of calculation by the Commission of the penalty payment was published in 
1997.3 In this communication the Commission declared that "Member States must be 
aware of how the financial penalties proposed by the Commission to the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities are to be calculated, and the method used must comply with 
the principles of proportionality and equal treatment for all Member States. It is also 
important to have a clear and consistent method, since the Commission must explain to 
the Court how it determined the penalty proposed."4 
The penalty to be paid is the sum of the amounts due in respect of each day's delay in 
implementing a judgement of the Court, beginning from the day on which the Court's 
second judgement was brought to the attention of the Member State concerned and ending 
when the latter complies with the judgement. The amount of the daily penalty is calculated 
as follows: a uniform flat-rate amount (ECU 500) is multiplied by two coefficients, one 
reflecting the seriousness of the infringement (at least 1 and no more than 20) and the 
other the duration (at least 1 and no more than 3); the result is multiplied by a special 
factor (n) reflecting the ability to pay of the Member State concerned (based on the GDP 
of the Member States) and the number of votes it has in the Council.5 
2 Memorandum on applying Article 171 of the EC treaty (96/C 242/07) OJ 1996 C 242. 6. p., point 2. 
3 Method of calculating the penalty payment provided for pursuant to Article 171 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1997 
C 63, 2. p.). 
4 1997 Communication, point 1. 
5 The "n" factor varies from 1 (Luxembourg) to 26,4 (Germany). 
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In the first case under Article 260 (2) which reached the Court,6 the Commission -
sticking to its Communication - applied for a daily penalty payment of 24.600 écu per 
day. On this point the question of discretionary power of the Court of Justice arose quite 
naturally. The Court had to decide on its attitude vis-à-vis the Commission's proposal 
concerning the financial penalty. Is it bound by it? If yes, to what extent? If no, how 
would it determine on the imposition of this type of sanction? 
III. Advocate General Colomer on the discretionary power of the Court vis-a-vis the 
Commission's proposal 
The Advocate General (AG) of the case, Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer took the view that the 
Court cannot depart at will from the general direction and amount set by the Commission. 
He elaborated four arguments: 
"88. ... if the Court of Justice had complete freedom to decide, on its own initiative, 
whether or not to impose a financial penalty and to set the amount of any penalty it did 
impose, the Commission's function, once it had brought the action, would be reduced to 
that of an amicus curiae ...In view of the special reference which the Treaty makes to it, 
the Commission's proposal must have greater legal significance than the pleadings or 
observations of the parties. 
89. ... it would be contrary to the scheme of Article 171 for the Commission to be 
the orchestrator of the proceedings - since it alone has authority to decide to initiate 
them and the power to terminate them by withdrawing its action - but for its proposals 
regarding actions to be no more than mere suggestions which have not the slightest 
bearing on the decision ultimately to be taken by the Court. 
90. ... If the Court of Justice had unfettered discretion as regards the imposition and 
setting of the coercive sanction, it would also take over the task of assessing 
considerations of political expediency, which would seriously upset the existing 
division of powers between the institutions of the Union. 
91. ... If the Court of Justice were to have complete freedom to impose and set the 
penalty it considered appropriate, without taking into account the Commission's 
proposal - with which, logically, the exchange of arguments between the parties will be 
concerned - what would become of the rights of defence?" 
The AG went on to ask the question "What, then, are the limits of the Court's power?" 
His answer - based on the analogy of the judicial review of the acts of Community 
institutions - was that "95 ... the Court must ensure that it does not substitute its own 
assessment for that carried out by the Commission so as not to distort the most important 
aspect of the judicial function it performs....The judicial review of a proposal for a 
sanction of this kind must seek rather to ensure observance of the principles of 
proportionality and equal treatment." 
6 C-387/97, Commission v Greece, [2000] ECR 1-5047. 
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IV. The Court's appreciation of its own discretion 
In its judgement the Court started with the legal nature of the Commission's 
communications. 
"84. In the absence of provisions in the Treaty, the Commission may adopt 
guidelines for determining how the lump sums or penalty payments which it intends 
to propose to the Court are calculated, so as, in particular, to ensure equal treatment 
between the Member States.... 
87. Those guidelines, setting out the approach which the Commission proposes to 
follow, help to ensure that it acts in a manner which is transparent, foreseeable and 
consistent with legal certainty and are designed to achieve proportionality in the 
amounts of the penalty payments to be proposed by it. 
88. The Commission's suggestion that account should be taken both of the gross 
domestic product of the Member State concerned and of the number of its votes in the 
Council appears appropriate in that it enables that Member State's ability to pay to be 
reflected while keeping the variation between Member States within a reasonable 
range." 
In this way the Court seems to be quite permissive concerning the principles and 
methods applied to the financial penalties elaborated by the Commission. But the Court 
did not stop here and continued as follows: "89 It should be stressed that these 
suggestions of the Commission cannot bind the Court. It is expressly stated in the third 
subparagraph of Article 171 (2) of the Treaty that the Court, if it finds that the Member 
State concerned has not complied with its judgment ... may impose a lump sum or a 
penalty payment on it. However, the suggestions are a useful point of reference." In the 
case at hand, the Court - having made its own appreciation of the seriousness and 
duration of the violation (not the ability to pay) and without making use of the method 
of calculation offered by the Commission - ordered Greece to pay a penalty payment of 
20 000 ECU per day. The paragraph 89 cited above turned out to be decisive as far as 
the Court's basic perception of its own discretionary power is concerned. It declared 
that the suggestions of the Commission cannot bind it, and these suggestions will serve 
only as "a useful point of reference". The formula has been repeated several times in the 
relevant case-law.7 
In the subsequent case-law, the Advocates-General and the Court itself seemed to 
accept the principles and the methods of decision regarding the penalty payment. They 
only maintained the discretionary power to give different weights to the factors which 
allow the possibility to evaluate the circumstances of the case, i.e. its seriousness and 
duration.8 In some cases the Court decided on its own consideration to depart from the 
7 See, for example, cases C-304/02, Commission v France, [2005]ECR 1-6262, par. 85.; C-70/06 
Commission v Portugal, [2008] ECR 1-1, par. 34.; C-369/07 Commission v Greece, [2009] ECR 1-5703, 
par. 112.; C-610/10, Commission v Spain, (not yet reported) par. 116. 
8 C-278/01 Commission v Spain, [2003] ECR 1-14141; C-304/02, Commission v France, [2005] ECR I-
6263; C-177/04, Commission v France, [2006] ECR 1-2461; C-70/06, Commission v Portugal, [2008] ECR 
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daily penalty payment system and ordered the payment on a half yearly basis.9 Only in a 
relatively recent case did it impose a daily penalty payment which departed 
considerably from the proposal of the Commission and the Advocate General as well.10 
V. Advocate General Geelhoed's revolutionary proposal: two financial penalties in the 
same case 
In 2004, in a case Commission v France11 AG Geelhoed - despite the fact that the 
Commission had only applied for a daily penalty payment - suggested imposing both of 
the financial sanctions. The Court decided to ask the Member States' observations on 
this issue closely related to the discretionary power: a) Whether the Court can impose 
both a lump sum and penalty payment? b) Whether the Court may, where appropriate, 
depart from the Commission's suggestions and impose a lump sum on a Member State 
even though the Commission had not proposed this? Thirteen (!) Member States 
answered the first question in the negative. They relied on the wording of the Article 
which actually says "penalty payment or lump sum", on the breach of the principles of 
legal certainty and transparency (the Commission did not publish guidelines on the 
criteria of the imposition of a lump sum), the ne bis in idem principle (both of the 
financial penalties take into account the length of the violation). The Court did not 
accept these objections and declared: 
"81.... While the imposition of a penalty payment seems particularly suited to 
inducing a Member State to put an end as soon as possible to a breach of 
obligations which, in the absence of such a measure, would tend to persist, the 
imposition of a lump sum is based more on assessment of the effects on public and 
private interests of the failure of the Member State concerned to comply with its 
obligations, in particular where the breach has persisted for a long period since the 
judgment which initially established it. 
82. That being so, recourse to both types of penalty provided for in Article 
228(2) EC is not precluded, in particular where the breach of obligations both has 
continued for a long period and is inclined to persist." 
The second question was answered in the affirmative only by the Czech, Hungarian 
and Finnish governments. They submitted that the Court has a discretion which extends 
to determining the penalty considered to be the most appropriate, irrespective of the 
I-l; C-109/08 Commission v Greece, [2009] ECR1-4657; C-369/07 Commission v Greece, [2009] ECR I-
5703. 
9 C-278/01, Commission v Spain, [2003] ECR 1-14141; C-533/11, Commission v Belgium (not yet reported). 
10 C-610/10, Commission v Spain, (not yet reported). In this case the Commission asked for 131,136 € per 
day; the Advocate General proposed 104,909 € per day. The Court (taking into account GDP and inflation 
in Spain at the time) imposed 50,000 €, without making use of the Commission's calculation scheme. 
" C-304/02, Commission v France, [2005] ECR 1-6262. 
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Commission's suggestions in this regard.12 Twelve governments took the opposite view, 
asserting that such a wide discretion would infringe the principles of legal certainty, 
predictability, transparency and equal treatment. The German government raised the 
argument that the Court lacks the political legitimacy necessary to exercise such a 
power in a field where assessments of political expediency play a considerable role. At 
the procedural level it stressed that so extensive a power is incompatible with the 
general principle of civil procedure - common to all the Member States - that courts 
cannot go beyond the parties' claims, and dwelt upon the need for an inter partes 
procedure enabling the Member State concerned to exercise its rights of defence.13 The 
French, Belgian, Netherlands, Austrian and Finnish governments dwelt upon the rights 
of defence. It is remarkable that most of these arguments are very close to those of AG 
Colomer which we have seen above. 
The Court rejected all of these considerations. The breach of the principles of legal 
certainty, predictability, transparency and equal treatment was rejected by reference to 
the arguments used to ascertain that the Court is not bound by the suggestions of the 
Commission. The procedure is not a civil procedure but a special judicial procedure for 
the enforcement of judgments.14 Concerning the lack of political legitimacy, the Court 
asserted that once the Commission has exercised its discretion as to the initiation of 
infringement proceedings the question of whether or not the Member State concerned 
has complied with a previous judgment of the Court is subjected to a judicial procedure 
in which political considerations are irrelevant. In the case at hand the Court imposed 
both of the two sanctions. 
VI. The Commission gives up a considerable part if its discretion — Communication 
2005 
After the judgment in Commission v France, there was the possibility that the 
Commission might not maintain its previous position according to which it would 
suggest only a penalty payment. In 2005 it published a new communication on the 
application of the Article 228 EC (2) (now Article 260 (2) TFEU); ("Communication 
2005").15 The new communication reflects the new perception of the Court - that the 
two sanctions may be imposed in the same case - and the position of the Court 
concerning the specific objective of the lump sum: sanctioning the violation of the 
Treaty and the necessity of taking account of the damage the infringement has caused to 
public and private interests. To some extent the Commission went even further. It fixed 
as a new rule that it will propose the imposition of both the financial sanctions. (Of 
course, if the violation has been brought to an end before the Court's judgment, it will 
withdraw the application for penalty payment.) 
12 Ibid. par. 87. 
13 Ibid. par. 88. 
14 Ibid, paras. 91-92. 
15 Communication SEC (2005) 1658 of 12 December 2005 entitled 'Application of Article 228 of the EC 
Treaty' (OJ 2007 C 126,12. p.) 
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In taking this action the Commission gave up a considerable part of its discretionary 
power, i.e. whether it would propose the imposition of a lump sum or not. This position 
is based on the argument that any case of persistent non-compliance with a Court 
judgment by a Member State, irrespective of any aggravating circumstances, in itself 
represents an attack on the principle of legality in a Community governed by the rule of 
law, which calls for a genuine sanction.16 If the Member State concerned complies with 
its EU law obligations just before the appreciation of the facts by the Court, it can 
maintain the unlawful situation for a considerable period of time without any negative 
consequence. 
. The Commission limited its margin of discretion to the determination of the amount 
of money it considers appropriate in the particular case. The fundamental considerations 
are the principles of proportionality and equal treatment. The actual amount of money 
also reflects the necessary deterrent effect on the Member State concerned (and may 
have a general preventive effect). The factors according to which the Commission will 
determine the amount of money it will apply for are the same as in the case of the 
penalty payment (seriousness, duration, deterrent effect). The calculation of the amount 
will be made following practically the same arithmetical formula as in the case of the 
penalty payment (see section II). 
This scheme introduces a highly automatised system for calculating of the amount of 
lump sum suggested by the Commission. The only multiplier which leaves a real 
margin of appreciation is the coefficient of seriousness. A specific characteristic of the 
determination of the amount of the lump sum payment is that there is a minimum 
amount for each Member State.17 The Commission presented the criteria which it 
intends to take into consideration when deciding on the actual value of the coefficient of 
seriousness: a) The importance of the rules breached. Infringements affecting 
fundamental rights or the four fundamental freedoms protected by the Treaty should be 
considered serious breaches, b) The judgment which the Member State has not 
complied with forms part of established case-law. c) The clarity of the of the rule 
breached can be a determining factor, d) If the Member State adopted measures it 
thought sufficient, but which the Commission considers insufficient, this is a different 
situation from one in which the Member State omits to take any action at all. e) A lack 
of full cooperation with the Commission during the procedure constitutes an 
aggravating factor.18 f) The effects of infringements on general or particular interests. 
Concerning the latter criterion, the Commission gives examples of facts which may 
influence the evaluation of the seriousness of the breach: any loss of the Community's 
own resources; the impact of the infringement on the way the Community functions; 
serious or irreparable damage to human health or the environment; economic or other 
harm suffered by individuals and economic operators, including intangible 
consequences, such as personal development; the financial sums involved in the 
infringement; any possible financial advantage that the Member State gains from not 
16 Communication (2005), point 10.2 
17 The lowest minimum amount is 180,000 euros (Malta), the highest is 12,700,000 euros (Germany). 
,s On this point the Commission refers to par. 92 of the conclusions of Advocate-General Geelhoed in Case 
C-304/02 (Commission v France). 
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complying with the judgment of the Court; the relative importance of the infringement, 
taking into account the turnover or added value of the economic sector concerned in the 
Member State in question; the size of the population affected by the infringement (the 
degree of seriousness could be considered less if the infringement does not concern the 
whole of the Member State in question); the Community's responsibility with respect to 
non-member countries; whether the infringement is a one-off or a repeat of an earlier 
infringement (for example, repeated delay in transposing directives in a certain sector). 
VII. The Court of Justice's perception of the lump sum as a financial sanction — non-
acceptance of the Commission's method 
As we have seen earlier, the Court widely accepted the principles and the method of 
calculation of the penalty payment proposed by the Commission in the communications 
1996/1997 (and maintained in Communication 2005). Examining the jurisprudence of 
the Court concerning appreciation of the lump sum it seems to be clear that this is not 
the case with the lump sum.19 The data in the Table show that there are important 
differences in the levels of payment set, relative to the amounts suggested. It also seems 
to be obvious that the Court refused to apply the method of calculation set out in its 
communications and put into practice by the Commission. Instead, the Court relied on 
its own appreciation and determined the amount payable in round sums, without any 
precise indication of the criteria applied. 
The Court clarified its position regarding Communication 2005 in Commission v 
France.20 It declared as it did concerning the penalty payment - that while guidelines may 
help to ensure that the Commission acts in a manner that is transparent, foreseeable and 
consistent with legal certainty, such rules cannot bind the Court in the exercise of the 
power conferred on it by Article 228 (2) EC.21 As far as the extent of this power is 
concerned, it specified that an order for the payment of a lump sum should not be made 
automatically as argued in the communication, since Article 228 "confers a wide 
discretion upon the Court whether it is necessary to impose such sanctions. "22 It is 
striking that the Court does not consider the Commission's suggestions as a "useful point 
of reference" as it did in case of the penalty payment. (In subsequent judgments it went on 
to qualify these suggestions as "merely guidance".23) This clearly indicates that the Court 
wishes to retain wider discretionary power than in case of the penalty payment. The Court 
also states how will it decide when it has the opportunity to impose a lump sum: "62 The 
" This was clearly stated in the opinion of Advocate General Mazak in Case C-407/09, Commission v 
Greece, (delivered on 16 December 2010): "46. It can be seen from the judgments in which the Court has 
ordered Member States to pay a lump sum that, in contrast to the fixing of a penalty payment, the Court has 
not adopted the method of calculation proposed by the Commission in its 2005 communication." 
20 C-121/07, Commission v France (GMO), [2008] ECR1-09159. 
21 Ibid. par. 61. 
22 Ibid, par 63. 
23 C-241/11, Commission v Czech Republic (not yet reported), par. 43.; C-576/11, Commission v 
Luxembourg (not yet reported) par. 60. 
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decision whether to impose a lump sum payment must, in each individual case, depend on 
all the relevant factors pertaining to both the particular nature of the infringement 
established and the individual conduct of the Member State involved in the procedure 
instigated pursuant to Article 228 EC." 
What seems to be of particular interest is the important weight accorded to the 
individual conduct of the Member State. We have seen in Communication 2005 that this 
is one of the factors affecting the seriousness of the infringement. Once the Court has 
decided to impose a lump sum payment it has to determine the amount the Member 
State has to pay. The relevant factors to be taken into account include the ability to pay 
of the Member State concerned, how long the breach of obligations has persisted since 
the judgment which initially established the breach was delivered (the duration) and the 
public and private interests involved.24 Here, we may see once again factors which were 
also included amongst the factors of seriousness in Communication 2005 (general 
and/or private interests) and the ability to pay of the Member State (the "n" factor) as a 
factor producing a kind of deterrent effect. The general statement became part of the 
established case-law of the Court, and was frequently repeated25 
VIII. How does the Court proceed with the imposition of a lump sum? 
I. General approach 
In cases under Article 260 (2) TFEU the Court first decides whether it would be 
justified in ordering the Member State concerned to pay a lump sum. In the second step 
it decides on the amount to be paid. This exercise depends on the necessity of the 
imposition of a penalty payment. Often, if the Court imposes a penalty payment 
(starting from the suggestions of the Commission) it refers broadly to the same 
circumstances (emphasising some of them, especially the duration) as it would in the 
case of a lump sum, and then turns to the determination of the amount of money to be 
paid, without adopting any method of calculation.26 If the penalty payment is not 
appropriate (i.e. the Member State has complied with its obligation(s) after the action 
had been brought), it considers only the appropriateness and the amount of the lump 
sum payable. 
The Court starts its argumentation on the necessity of the imposition of a lump sum. 
It takes into account different criteria concerning the special circumstances of the breach 
and the conduct of the Member State concerned. (We have looked at these criteria under 
24 Ibid. par. 64. 
25 See Cases C-369/07, Commission v Greece, par. 144.; C-407/09, Commission v Greece, par. 30.; C-
279/11, Commission v Ireland (not yet reported) paras. 65-67.; C-241/11, Commission v Czech Republic, 
paras. 40-50.; C-533/11, Commission v Belgium (not yet reported) paras. 49-53. 
26 C-l09/08, Commission v Greece, [2009] ECR 1-4657. paras. 53-54.; C-576/11, Commission v 
Luxembourg, paras. 61-65.; C-369/07, Commission v Greece, par. 145.; C-496/09, Commission v Italy (not 
yet reported) paras. 84-91.; C-610/10 Commission v Spain (not yet reported) par. 145. 
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point VI.) After "proving" the appropriateness of the imposition of this sanction,27 the 
Court decides on the amount of money and the method of payment (on a daily or half 
yearly basis, payment in instalments etc.). In most of the cases it simply refers only to 
the circumstances analysed in the previous part of the judgment.28 However, it can 
happen that it produces a detailed analysis of the seriousness and duration of the 
violation and the conduct of the Member State in question only in the "amount of a 
lump sum payment" section.29 
2. Factors taken into account in the Court's appreciation 
There are several factors taken into consideration by the Court concerning the 
seriousness of the breach; the duration of the violation; the Member State's conduct; the 
Member State's ability to pay. 
2.1 Seriousness of the breach 
(1) The importance of the rules breached. As the lump sum is concerned with 
sanctioning the impact of the violation of EU law on public and private interests, its 
amount has to reflect the importance of the rule(s) breached. The jurisprudence of the 
Court consequently mirrors this approach. In its argumentation regarding the 
appropriateness of a lump sum, or when it turns to the business of setting the amount, 
one always finds a presentation dealing with the importance of the rule breached. In 
Commission v France (GMO) the Court emphasised that "... where failure to comply 
with a judgment of the Court is likely to harm the environment and endanger human 
health, the protection of which is, indeed, one of the Community's environmental policy 
objectives, as is apparent from Article 174 EC, such a breach is of a particularly serious 
nature" 30 
The Court consequently held that the Treaty rules on State aid (the common market) 
are of a vital nature, so the repayment of any unlawfully paid State aid is important.31 In 
Commission v Greece (opticians) the breach of the fundamental freedom of 
establishment was assessed very narrowly by the Court. It is interesting to note that in 
this case the Courtas was suggested by the Commission's communication - looked at 
the impact of the violation on the companies or firms established in other Member 
27 Only in one case did the Court decide not to impose a lump sum in spite of the fact that it declared there 
had been non-compliance with its earlier judgment. C-503/04, Commission v Germany, [2007] ECR I-
6153. 
28 C-121/07, Commission v France; C-568/07, Commission v Greece, [2009] ECR 1-4505; C-407/09, 
Commission v Greece, [2011] ECR 1-2467; C-184/11, Commission v Spain (not yet reported); C-279/11, 
Commission v Ireland. 
29 C-241/11, Commission v Czech Republic; C-270/11, Commission v Sweden (not yet reported). 
30 C-121/07, Commission v France, [2008] ECR 1-9159, par. 77. The importance of the EU rules on 
environment and human health was already emphasised in the "pre-lump sum" Art. 260 jurisprudence. See 
to this effect C-387/97, Commission v Greece, par. 94.; C-278/01, Commission v Spain, par. 37. 
31 C-369/07, Commission v Greece, paras. 118-120.; C-610/10, Commission v Spain, paras. 125-127.; C-
184/11, Commission v Spain, paras. 69-71. 
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States.32 In a similar reasoning the Court found that the national legislation infringed the 
principles of the free movement of goods, the freedom to provide services and freedom 
of establishment and led to a reduction in the volume of imports from other Member 
States, caused those imports to stop when the prohibition of national law came into 
force and prevented traders from other Member States from providing their services, or 
even establishing themselves in Greece for that purpose.33 
(2) Efforts made by the Member State in order to comply. In several judgments the 
Court appreciated the efforts made to comply by the Member State which had violated 
its obligations under EU law. This is particularly the case when the compliance requires 
considerable investment.34 If, however, the obligation requires the adoption of a 
legislative act by the Member State, the Court tends to qualify the failure to do so as an 
aggravating factor.35 
In Commission v Spain the Court appreciated that its earlier judgment had been 
complied with as regards three of the four recipients of the unlawful aid.36 
2.2. Duration of the breach 
In its seminal judgment, the Court attributed a great importance to the period of time 
over which the infringement persisted.37 The time factor plays a decisive role in 
"proving" the appropriateness of the imposition of a lump sum, and also in determining 
its amount. Unlike the Commission, which gives a predetermined weight to the 
duration, the Court uses general phrases, such as "[thejconsiderable delay that occurred, 
after that judgment had been delivered";38 "that failure must be regarded as having 
persisted for more than four years, which is a considerable period of time";39 "the 
breach of obligations has persisted for a long period";40 (almost 27 months) a 
"significant period of time";41 "approximately 9 years, which is excessive";42 "[the 
infringement] has persisted for approximately seven years, which is excessive".43 
2.3. Individual conduct of the Member State 
The individual conduct of the Member State concerned was perceived as "a lack of 
full cooperation with the Commission during the procedure" and incorporated into 
Communication 2005 as an aggravating factor which influences the coefficient of 
32 C-568/07, Commission v Greece, paras. 54-56. 
33 C-109/08, Commission v Greece, paras. 33-34. 
34 C-533/11, Commission v Belgium, par. 59.; C-576/11, Commission v Luxembourg, par. 62. 
35 C-369/07, Commission v Greece, par. 70.; C-568/07, Commission v Greece, par. 53., C-121/07, 
Commission v France, par. 70. 
36 C-610/10, Commission v Spain, par. 128. 
37 C-304/02, Commission v France, par. 81. 
38 C-121/07, Commission v France, par.70. 
39 C-369/07, Commission v Greece, par.l 17. 
40 C-109/08, Commission v Greece, par. 53. 
41 C-270/11, Commission v Sweden, paras. 57-58. 
42 C- 533/11, Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, par. 54. 
43 C-576/11, Commission v. Luxembourg, par. 64. 
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seriousness. While the case-law of the Court reflects this perception,44 it developed an 
alleviating factor related to the propensity to cooperate with the Commission during the 
procedure, under Article 260 (2). In Commission v Belgium the Court emphasised that 
"the Kingdom of Belgium has fully cooperated with the Commission during the 
proceedings;45 in Commission v Czech Republic it was stated that "(the Czech Republic) 
cooperated in good faith with the Commission."46 In this case the Court set a lump sum 
even lower than the minimum established for that Member State by the Commission. 
In Commission v Spain the Court widened the scope of the Member State's 
behaviour which it took into consideration, going beyond the scope allowed for the 
procedure under Article 260 (2): it took into consideration the fact that the defendant 
State for many years did make the required effort and had taken steps to comply only a 
short time before the Commission brought the action.47 We suggest that in Commission 
v Sweden the Court went far beyond even these considerations when it "invented" a new 
mitigating circumstance: ". . . the fact that the Kingdom of Sweden has never failed to 
comply with any judgment previously given by the Court under Article 258 TFEU 
should be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance."48 It is an open question 
whether this circumstance - which is reminiscent of a similar approach in the criminal 
law to the personality of the criminal - will be maintained in the future. (It would hardly 
be acceptable if all Member States which have never failed to comply with a judgment 
given under Article 258 - the majority of the Member States - were to be "released".) 
Maybe the Court wished to honour the overall behaviour of Sweden as a long-standing 
champion of compliance with the law of the EU.49 
Communication 2005 indicated that the seriousness (the impact on public or private 
interests) will be qualified as an aggravating factor if the infringement in the case 
follows several breaches in a certain sector. Obviously the Court accepted this factor, 
and uses it when it decides on the necessity of the imposition of a lump sum.50 It is 
remarkable that this criterion goes beyond the case under scrutiny, and tends to take into 
consideration the recidivious nature of the Member State in question, and brings the 
lump sum closer to a penal sanction. 
2.4 Ability to pay 
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the principle of proportionality concerning the 
deterrent effect of the financial sanctions, the Commission uses in its application the 
coefficient "n" which mainly reflects the GDP of the Member States. The Court also 
44 In Case C-407/09, Commission v Greece, the Court stated: "33. Thus with regard, first, to the conduct of 
that Member State, it should be pointed out that the Greek authorities responded with substantial delays 
both to the formal notice and to the reasoned opinion." See also C-184/11, Commission v Spain (State aid), 
par. 67. 
45 C-533/11, Commission v Belgium, par. 60. 
46 C-241/11, Commission v Czech Republic, par. 51. 
47 C-610/10, Commission v Spain, par. 130. 
48 C-270/11, Commission v Sweden, par. 55. 
49 For figures, see Annual Reports of the Court of Justice 2009 and 2013 (Actions for failure of a Member 
State to fulfil its obligations.) 
50 C-121/07, Commission v France; C-184/11, Commission v Spain; C-279/11, Commission v Ireland. 
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relies on this in its judgments on penalty payments.51 In the case of a lump sum the 
Court does not seem to follow this method, having never referred to this coefficient. 
However, in recent times of economic crisis the Court has been sensitive to the 
precarious situation of certain Member States, and ordered the payment of a relatively 
modest lump sum.52 
IX. Conclusion 
The Court of Justice rightly interpreted that the provisions of Article 260 (2) TFEU give 
it a wide discretionary power. Using this margin of appreciation it has chosen different 
methods in the imposition of the two types of financial sanctions. Concerning the 
penalty payment, it has decided to follow the principles and method of calculation 
suggested by the Commission, using the proposals of the Commission as "useful point 
of reference". As far as the imposition of a lump sum is concerned, the Court retained -
or vindicated - a wide discretionary power. It maintained a considerable distance from 
the method of calculation adopted by the Commission. Although the guiding principles 
on which the judgments are based are common to those of the Commission, they are too 
general and require a set of criteria which should be taken into account systematically. 
The criteria used in deciding on the necessity of the imposition of a lump sum and 
the amount to be paid are not far form those published and used by the Commission, but 
there is no list of criteria and the weight given to any particular criterion is uncertain or 
non-existent. The Court widened the scope available for considering the conduct of the 
Member State concerned too far. Counter-balancing the rigidity of the Commission, the 
Court introduced a new criterion - i.e. the Member State's reduced ability to pay in an 
economic crisis. In conclusion, we can share the position adopted by AG Jaaskinen 
when defending the adoption of the imposition of a lump sum as a ' fair and coherent 
practice, [...] helping to make judicial decisions more foreseeable": "The 
communications [of the Commission] contribute to the development of a methodical and 
rigorous approach by the Court to the imposition of pecuniary penalties. ...They 
therefore constitute both an indicative starting point for the Court for the overall 
assessment of the infringement complained of and a mechanism to ensure that the 
amount of the penalty does not become arbitrary or subjective, even though that amount 
will never be mathematically objective. "53 
51 C-387/97, Commission v Greece, [2000] ECR 1-5047, par. 88. 
52 C-407/09, Commission v Greece, par. 26. Similar statement in C-279/11, Commission v Ireland, par. 79. 
53 Opinion in the case C-241/11, Commission v Czech Republic, delivered on 21 March 2013. 
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Table 
Financial sanctions in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
Case Penalty payment 
proposed by the 
Commission 
Penalty payment 
imposed by the Court 
of Justice 
Lump sum proposed 
by the Commission 
Lump sum imposed 
by the Court of 
Justice 
C-387/97, 
Commission v Greece 24 600 € per day 20 000 6 per day 
C-278/01, 
Commission v Greece 45 600 € per day 624 150 6 per year 
C-304/02, 
Commission v France 316 500 6 per day 
57 761 250 6 per six 
months None 20 000 000 6 
C-177/04, 
Commission v France 
(product liability) 




21 450 6 per day 19 392 6 per day 
C-121/07, 
Commission v France 366 744 6 per day 43 660 € per day 10 000 000 6 
C-369/07, 
Commission v Greece 53 611 € per day 16 000 6 per day 2 000 000 6 
C-568/07, 
Commission v Greece 98 988 000 6 1 000 000 6 
C-109/08, 
Commission v Greece 
9 636 € per day 31 536 € per day 3 420 780 6 3 000 000 6 
C-407/09, 
Commission v Greece 8 700 000 € 3 000 000 6 
C-496/09, 
Commission v Italy 
244 800 6 30 000 000 6 per six 
months 27 000 € per day 30 000 000 6 
C-610/10, 
Commission v Spain 
131 136 6 per day 50 000 6 per day 14 343 6 per day 20 000 000 6 
C-184/11, 
Commission v Spain 64 543 500 6 30 000 000 6 
C-241/11, 
Commission v Czech 
Republic 




4 088 322 3 000 000 6 
C-279/11, 




55 836 6 per day 859 404 6 per six 
months 




11 340 6 per day 2 800 € pet day 1 248 6 per day 2 000 000 6 
